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THE EVOLUTION OF THE “SURVIVING 







Elizabeth A. Marcuccio*  





 Under the Estates Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) the 
concept of the surviving spouse was originally used as a proxy 
for the person closest to and/or most dependent upon the 
deceased spouse; the natural object of the deceased spouse’s 
bounty. As a result the surviving spouse has priority to 
administer the deceased spouse’s estate, as well as priority of 
intestate distribution. In addition the surviving spouse has the 
right to take an elective share of the deceased spouse’s estate. 
Since these rights are significant, should they be automatically 
available to all individuals who meet the statutory definition of 
“surviving spouse”? What of spouses who remain married but 
live apart for years? What of married partners who develop 
fulfilling committed relationships with other persons, without 
formally divorcing their spouse?  
_______________________ 
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What of surviving spouses who wrongfully enter into 
marriages with incapacitated individuals solely to manipulate a 
testamentary scheme for their own financial gain?  Marriage is 
now understood as an economic partnership rather than a 
sacred contract for life. Thus the current estate concept of 
“surviving spouse” may no longer serve the purpose for which 
it was originally intended. 
 
II. MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE 
 An important question to address is whether an 
individual should be entitled to the benefits that accrue to a 
surviving spouse if she effectively is in a marriage of 
convenience. In the Estate of Shoichiro Hama1 the Court 
examined this issue. In Hama the spouse, Yuko Machida, 
worked for the decedent and they dated with the understanding 
that their relationship was not exclusive. In late 2004, with 
decedent’s knowledge, Machida began a relationship with 
Travis Klose, with whom she and the decedent socialized. 
Early in 2005 Klose moved to Japan, and in May 2005 
Machida moved into the decedent’s apartment.2  
 In 2006 decedent told his accountant that he intended to 
sell his condominium apartment in Manhattan. Decedent was 
informed that there would be a capital gains tax on the sale of 
approximately $60,000. When asked by the decedent what 
could be done to mitigate this tax, the accountant stated, in jest, 
that if the decedent was married on the date that the apartment 
was sold, there would be no capital gains tax. A few weeks 
later, on July 7, 2006, decedent married Machida. Decedent 
sold his apartment on September 6, 2006, and in November 
2006 decedent informed his accountant that he wanted to 
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divorce Machida.3 Due to the large tax savings decedent 
received because of  his marriage, his accountant advised him 
against divorce, and recommended that he stay married for 
approximately two years.  
 In 2007 decedent and Machida moved to Japan. Here, 
with decedent’s knowledge, Machida continued her 
relationship with Klose. Feeling pressure from her parents, 
Machida registered in Japan as being married to Klose. 
Decedent was fully aware of her plan to register as married to 
Klose, and acted as a witness to said marriage, signing the 
marriage certificate and affixing his personal seal.4 Despite this 
“registration” or “marriage”, decedent still considered himself 
legally married to Machida and entitled to the tax benefits that 
resulted from that marriage. In August 2009 decedent 
contacted his accountant by email and discussed his intention 
to sell another apartment in New York. He also asked whether 
he could now obtain a divorce from Machida. Due to the tax 
savings decedent could realize on the upcoming real estate 
transaction, his accountant again advised against divorce. 
Decedent died without a will on September 4, 2009, leaving an 
estate of approximately $1.5 million subject to administration 
in New York. He was survived by his parents and Machida, his 
“surviving spouse”.5 
 
 On December 4, 2009, Machida petitioned for the 
issuance of letters of administration to herself and her designee, 
and on January 11, 2010, decedent’s parents cross-petitioned 
for the same.6 Temporary Letters of Administration were 
issued to Machida’s designee. The designee of decedent’s 
parents filed a motion for summary judgment seeking 
revocation of the temporary letters and dismissal of Machida’s 
administration petition based on the claim of spousal 
abandonment.7 
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 III. SPOUSAL ABANDONMENT 
 The Estates Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) provides 
that a husband or wife is a surviving spouse unless it is 
established that said spouse abandoned the deceased spouse, 
and such abandonment continued until the time of death.8  The 
statute contains no definition of “abandonment,” but 
historically, the courts have recognized the requirements of the 
Domestic Relations Law (DRL) as implicit in the EPTL.9 The 
standard used to determine if a surviving spouse abandoned the 
decedent is the same standard used to determine whether the 
party would have been entitled to a decree of separation or 
divorce on the grounds of abandonment.10  The DRL states that 
the abandonment must be for a period of one or more years,11 
and long-standing case law further states that departure from 
the marital abode or living apart is not enough to constitute 
abandonment. In Matter of Maiden the Court defined 
abandonment as the unjustified departure of a spouse from the 
marital home without the consent of the other spouse.12  
 
 That abandonment must include lack of consent by the 
spouse that was left behind continues to be the law to this 
day.13 Even if the decedent and the surviving spouse lived apart 
for decades, without evidence that the spouse’s departure was 
without the decedent’s consent, there is no abandonment.14 The 
burden of proof as to abandonment, including lack of consent, 
is on the party alleging it.15 Applying this standard to the Hama 
case, the Court found that the decedent’s parents could not 
meet the burden of proof. The decedent’s participation in the 
registration of Machida’s marriage to Klose is the exact 
opposite of the “lack of consent” needed to find 
abandonment.16 The Court, however, did not rely on these 
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cases when deciding Hama. Instead the Court turned to another 
appellate decision, Matter of Oswald17 in deciding this case. 
 
IV. THE IMPACT OF OSWALD 
 
 In Matter of Oswald the “surviving spouse” alleged the 
he and the decedent had entered into a common law marriage 
in Pennsylvania some years prior to the decedent’s death. The 
parties subsequently exchanged mutual releases, and each went 
on to marry another.18 The Court found that there was 
abandonment, quoting language in the trial court opinion in 
Matter of Bingham19. “The court knows of no more convincing 
evidence of abandonment than the public ceremonial 
remarriage of the petitioner to another woman in the lifetime of 
the decedent and his cohabitation with such woman as husband 
and wife.”20 Here, instead of focusing on the lack of consent of 
the spouse left behind, the Court’s focus is entirely on the 
intent of the spouse who left, defining abandonment as 
desertion of a spouse with the intent not to return, or with the 
intent that the marriage should no longer exist.21 This is 
contrary to prior case law. 
 
 The Court of Appeals affirmed Oswald without 
opinion.22 Thus it is unknown whether the Court agreed that 
abandonment could be found based upon the leaving party’s 
intent not to return, creating an exception to its longstanding 
Maiden23 decision, or whether the Court agreed that a marriage 
never existed, which was a hotly contested issue in this case. In 
the end, in deciding Hama the Court found that whether 
Oswald did or did not partially overrule or create an exception 
to Maiden was ultimately for the Court of Appeals to 
determine, and held that Machida had abandoned the decedent, 
thereby losing her rights as a surviving spouse.24 
 
V. PUBLIC POLICY 
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 For decades the courts have been applying the 
abandonment requirements of the Domestic Relations Law to 
determine whether an individual qualifies as a surviving spouse 
under the EPTL. The abandonment disqualifications of EPTL 
5-1.2 (5) apply to three distinct issues relating to a deceased 
spouse’s estate: the right to serve as administrator,25 the right to 
an intestate share,26 and the right to elect against a will where 
the surviving spouse is left less than one-third of the deceased 
spouse’s estate. 27 If the deceased spouse meets the definition of 
a “wronged” spouse who is eligible for a divorce based on 
abandonment under the DRL, the living spouse does not 
qualify as a “surviving spouse” and is not entitled to the related 
benefits.  
 
 The Court in Hama examined the history of spousal 
relationships under New York’s divorce law, noting that in 
2010 New York did away with fault-based divorce, the system 
from which the concept of abandonment first arose. Now 
whether a spouse seeking a divorce was truly “wronged” by 
having been left against his or her wishes, with the 
accompanying burden of proving lack of consent, becomes far 
less important, if not irrelevant. Therefore the strict definition 
of abandonment in the DRL, which has been carried over into 
the EPTL, may no longer be valid or justified.28  
 
VI. WRONGFUL MARRIAGES 
 
 Another issue that courts have addressed is whether a 
“surviving spouse” is entitled to an elective share if the 
marriage occurred while the decedent lacked the requisite 
mental capacity to enter into a marriage contract. New York 
does not have a statute that specifically addresses this situation. 
In Campbell v. Thomas29 the decedent was diagnosed with 
terminal cancer and severe dementia due to Alzheimer’s 
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disease early in 2000. His daughter, who was also his primary 
caretaker, took a one-week vacation in February 2001. 
Decedent, who was then 72 years old, was left in the care of 
Nidia Thomas, then 58. During this time Nidia and the 
decedent were secretly married, and Nidia subsequently 
transferred certain assets of the decedent into her name.30 
 
 In March 2001 decedent’s daughter learned of the 
marriage. She confronted the decedent, who had no awareness 
of the marriage and adamantly denied that it occurred. 
Decedent died in August 2001.31 In November 2001 decedent’s 
children commenced an action in Supreme Court seeking a 
judgment declaring Nidia’s marriage to the decedent to be null 
and void. The complaint was later amended to add causes of 
action alleging undue influence, conversion and fraud.32 In 
January 2003 decedent’s son was issued letters of 
administration C.T.A., and in May 2003 Nidia filed a right of 
election in Surrogate’s Court.33 Decedent’s children moved for 
summary judgment in Supreme Court, submitting affidavits 
detailing the decedent’s mental state over the past three years. 
Due to his dementia decedent had become extremely forgetful 
and experienced great confusion as to who various individuals 
were. The decedent’s primary physician and neurologist 
confirmed that decedent did not have the mental capacity to 
provide for himself or understand his legal and financial 
affairs.34 This information had been conveyed to Nidia.35 
 
 In opposition to the children’s motion for summary 
judgment and in support of her cross motion for the same, 
Nidia submitted her own affidavit stating that she had had a 25-
year, non-exclusive relationship with the decedent during 
which he asked her to marry him four times. She stated that he 
had the requisite mental capacity to enter into the marriage 
vows, even though he did have moments of forgetfulness. The 
affidavits of the pastor who performed the marriage and the 
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two witnesses to the marriage each asserted that the decedent 
knew he was marrying Nidia, however the pastor, when 
deposed, stated that he would not have performed the 
ceremony if he knew of the decedent’s medical condition.36 
 
 The Supreme Court denied both motions for summary 
judgment and the decedent’s children appealed. In 2007 the 
Second Department remitted the matter to the Supreme Court 
for the entry of judgment declaring the marriage and all asset 
transfers by Nidia null and void due to decedent’s lack of 
capacity to understand his actions and inability to consent.37 
The Supreme Court issued an order consistent with the ruling 
of the Appellate Division.38 Nidia appealed. 
 
VII. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
 
 On appeal Nidia contended that pursuant to the relevant 
statutes, she should be considered the decedent’s surviving 
spouse at the time of the decedent’s death even if the marriage 
is subsequently annulled or voided.  Therefore she is entitled to 
an elective share of the decedent’s estate. The Domestic 
Relations Law states that if a party to a marriage is “incapable 
of consenting to a marriage for want of understanding” such 
marriage is voidable.39 The DRL defines a voidable marriage as 
void from the time its nullity is declared by a court of 
competent jurisdiction.40 The Court disagreed with Nidia’s 
reasoning, stating that under the DRL the distinction is not that 
void marriages are nonexistent from the beginning, while 
voidable marriages are valid until declared void. Rather both 
void and voidable marriages are void from their beginning, the 
difference between them being that parties to a void marriage 
are free to treat the marriage as a nullity without the 
involvement of a court, while a voidable marriage may be 
treated as a nullity only if a court decrees it so.41 
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 The Court then examined whether its determination that 
Nidia’s marriage to the decedent was null and void rendered 
the marriage void from its beginning for purposes of the right 
of election. The DRL provides: 
 
An action to annul a marriage on the 
ground that one of the parties thereto was 
a mentally ill person may be maintained at 
any time during the continuance of the 
mental illness, or, after the death of the 
mentally ill person in that condition, and 
during the life of the other party to the 
marriage, by any relative of the mentally 
ill person who has an interest to avoid the 
marriage.42 
 
Yet the EPTL provides that a husband or wife is considered a 
“surviving spouse” with a right of election against the deceased 
spouse’s estate unless a final decree or judgment of divorce or 
annulment was in effect when the deceased spouse died or that 
under the DRL the marriage was void as incestuous, bigamous 
or a prohibited remarriage.43 As the Court in Campbell noted, 
this provision appears to render the right of family members to 
obtain a post-death annulment largely illusory.44 The marriage 
between Nidia and the decedent was not declared a nullity until 
the Court declared it so in January 2007, more than five years 
after the decedent’s death. Thus under the EPTL Nidia 
technically had a legal right to an elective share as a surviving 
spouse.45  However the literal terms of a statute should not be 
rigidly applied if to do so would allow the statute to be an 
instrument for the protection of fraud.46 
 
VIII. EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES 
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 The Court in Campbell acknowledged that the Supreme 
Court is a court of equity as well as law, and is empowered to 
grant relief consistent with the principle that a person should 
not be permitted to profit from her own fraud.47 Pursuant to this 
doctrine, the wrongdoer is deemed to have forfeited the benefit 
that would flow from her wrongdoing. The Court found that 
there were ample facts to conclude that Nidia was aware of the 
decedent’s lack of capacity to consent to marriage, and that she 
took unfair advantage of his condition for her own pecuniary 
gain, at the expense of the decedent’s heirs. Since she procured 
the marriage through overreaching and undue influence, Nidia 
should not be permitted to benefit from that conduct. 
Therefore, she has forfeited any rights that would flow from 
that marital relationship, including her statutory right to an 
elective share of decedent’s estate.48 
 
 That Nidia had known the decedent for 25 years, had a 
close relationship with him, and had legitimately been named 
as one of the beneficiaries of his retirement account does not 
reduce her culpability. These facts indicate that Nidia was in a 
position of trust, which she abused, and that she could not 
plausibly deny awareness of the decedent’s mental 
incapacity.49 Under these circumstances equity intervenes to 
prevent unjust enrichment of the wrongdoer.50 The Court found 
that this result was necessary not only to protect incapacitated 
individuals and their rightful heirs from overreaching and 
undue influence; it was also necessary to protect the integrity 




 The current estate definition of “surviving spouse” is 
largely based on the antiquated societal definition of 
“marriage”. The shifting concept of what constitutes a family, 
the alterations in economic dependence and the need to protect 
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the elderly in an aging society all suggest the need to review 
the statutory protections afforded a surviving spouse. This is 
especially true when individuals marry solely to obtain 
financial gain. One question deserves consideration: Does it 
matter whether it was the decedent or the surviving spouse who 
entered into the marriage to attain a financial windfall?   
 
 In the Estate of Shoichiro Hama52 the decedent married 
Machida solely to avoid $60,000 of capital gains tax upon the 
sale of his Manhattan condominium. This is evident from the 
decedent’s behavior. Decedent married Machida “a few weeks” 
after he learned of the tax advantages of being married. Four 
months after the marriage and two months after the sale of his 
condominium, decedent wanted a divorce.53 Although it is 
unknown whether Machida was financially compensated for 
marrying the decedent, it was the decedent who initiated the 
marriage to obtain favorable treatment under the income tax 
laws. The Court found that Machida had abandoned the 
decedent, thereby losing her rights as a surviving spouse, even 
though prior case law did not dictate this result. Did the 
decedent, a sophisticated businessman who exploited the 
institution of marriage for financial gain, deserve the Court’s 
sympathy? He could have easily entered into a prenuptial 
agreement to prevent Machida from obtaining the statutory 
rights of a surviving spouse. This is not true of incapacitated 
individuals who are enticed into marriage by wrongdoers.  
 
 In Campbell v. Thomas54 the decedent’s caregiver, 
Nidia, was well aware of the decedent’s lack of capacity when 
she secretly married him. It appears from the facts of the case 
that Nidia’s sole purpose in marrying the decedent was to 
obtain the financial benefits of a surviving spouse upon the 
decedent’s death. Here the Court rightfully exercised its 
equitable powers to prevent Nidia from benefiting from her 
wrongdoing, and declared that she forfeited her rights as a 
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surviving spouse. In light of these cases, who can qualify as a 
“surviving spouse” under the relevant statutes deserves careful 
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